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5Abstract
Raising the participation at the lower end of the labour market abstract is hindered by
the high burden of taxation. Therefore, recently, in some European countries serious
efforts have been made to make work pay. In this paper an overview of these current
efforts is given. With the exception of Germany there seems to be a consistent policy of
making work pay through the introduction of a substantial in-work tax credit and a
decrease of the basic rate. In some countries due to distributing aspects the in-work tax
credit is targeted to families with children. Moreover, two countries have a back to work
allowance or premium for benefit claimants. Given the limited resources for future tax
reforms, increase of in-work credits seem appropriate for further progress in making
work pay.
Keywords : tax reforms, income tax, make work pay, tax credit
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71. Introduction
One of the most severe problems in Europe is the low rate of employment at the ‘lower
end’ of the labour market. In most European countries it seems that the high burden of
taxation and income dependent benefits do not stimulate labour market participation.
An interesting debate about this issue is taking place and important measures to reform
tax and benefit systems to tackle this problem have already been taken. Tax and benefits
reforms with as objective stimulation of employment opportunities have been
announced. It is well-known that the US and Canada have incorporated in-work credits
in their tax system (cf. Haveman and Wolfe (2000), Duncan and Gilles (1996)).
Recently, as will be shown in this paper, some European countries have introduced
these credits as well. In the Netherlands as from January 2001, a new income tax act has
been implemented. Working is made more attractive by the introduction of an
employment tax credit. In Belgium a tax reform with the introduction of in-work credit
has been proposed and will be discussed by Parliament.  Moreover, in the UK from
October 1999 the replacement of the Family Credit by a Working Families Tax Credit
(WFTC) has increased in-work benefits. Ireland has already put measures in place to
make work pay and discusses a move to a system of tax credits. In Finland there has
been an increase of the so-called municipal earned income allowance. In Germany a
different route has been taken. Here, a large tax reform has been announced in which
the basic personal allowance is significantly raised and tax rates are significantly
lowered.
In order to improve the situation at the lower end of the labour market, there are various
alternative policies. In this paper the possible reductions in income taxes are analysed.
Hereby, the incentives of unemployed persons or partners to accept jobs are
strengthened. It should be noticed that besides weak financial incentives, a shortage of
productivity for low-skilled workers can be a reason for high unemployment. Raising
the productivity of low-skilled by enhancing their skills is a solution for this problem.
Bridging the gap between productivity and wage cost by an employment subsidy can be
an effective policy as well. In Europe, we see a development towards more targeted
approaches, both on the productivity gap and incentives (cf. Lönnroth (2000)). Our
contribution is focused on incentives.
Before presenting the different policies, in section 2 of the paper a brief assessment of
Europe’s labour market and income-distributional policies is given. Special attention
will be paid to an outline of the situation concerning replacement rates. It is shown that
the replacement rates in some countries come close to 100% so that for a benefit-
claimant the acceptance of a job may result in hardly any income gain at all.
In section 3 of the paper an overview of the policy measures is presented that have
already been taken to make work pay. Hereby, an overview of six countries is given: the
Netherlands, UK, Finland, Ireland, Germany and Belgium. Recently, in all countries
measures have been taken to make work more attractive. In section 4 we compare the
8different policies of these countries. Although serious steps have been taken, the
replacement rates are still very high and further measures are needed. The potential for
further efforts will be discussed in section 5.
2. The current situation of the European labour market
2.1 Labour market conditions
The European economy seems to be in good shape. According to recent OECD-figures
real GDP-growth is projected to increase to about 3% in 2000 and slowing slightly in
2001. Especially, in the Euro region figures reflect a sharp decline in joblessness. For
example in Germany even with cuts being made in public programmes, a reduction in
the unemployment rate by almost one percent since summer 1999 is noticed. Other
countries face a decline in the unemployment rate as well. For some countries, like the
Netherlands and Ireland, there seems a risk of overheating. The number of vacancies is
growing and is above the peak of the previous cycle, at the beginning of the last decade.
Although unemployment is decreasing rapidly, participation rates at the ‘lower end’ of
the market are still very low. This is especially the case for low-skilled persons (see
table 1).
Table 1. Participation rates by educational attainment
Less than upper
secondary education
Upper secondary
Education
Tertiary
Education
Belgium
Finland
Germany
Ireland
United Kingdom
Netherlands
47.3
54.1
49.2
48.6
54.3
52.1
72.1
71.0
71.0
66.6
76.0
74.0
83.7
82.1
84.2
83.0
85.5
82.8
Source: OECD (1998)
This table shows that the labour market position of low skilled is a matter of concern in
all considered countries.
Furthermore, research by the OECD has shown that the unemployed households make
out a large share of the poor population (individuals living in households with incomes
below 50% of the median adjusted disposable income of the entire population, table 2).
In Finland and Belgium the share of unemployed households in the poor population
seems relatively low. The reason for this is that in these countries the level of social
assistance is not means-tested by the family income. In this case getting a small job
while your partner receives social assistance does not lead to a cut in the amount of
social assistance. Furthermore, the level of social assistance is high in the Scandinavian
9countries and Belgium. This seems to be the explanation for the large share of
households with one worker in the poor population of these countries.
Table 2: Individuals of working-age in the poor population by the labour force
status of their household (as a % of total households in poor population)
Non-employed
households
Households with
one worker
Households with
two workers
Belgium (1995) 35.7 60.8 3.5
Finland (1995) 32.9 39.8 27.2
Germany (1994) 54.7 42.3 3.0
Ireland - - -
Netherlands (1995) 54.4 38.5 7.1
United Kingdom (1995) 44.9 41.8 13.3
Source: OECD (2000b)
Individuals in a jobless household have a higher risk of being poor. This is in particular
the case for households with children.
In tax reforms income distributional goals are important as well. Table 3 shows the level
and trend in income equality from the mid 80s to the mid 90s in the different countries.
Table 3: Gini coefficients in the mid 80s and mid 90s
Gini coefficient mid 80s Gini coefficient mid 90s Difference
Belgium 26% 27.2% 1.2%
Finland 20.7% 22.8% 2.1%
Germany 26.5% 28.2% 1.7%
Ireland 33% 32.4% - 0.6%
Netherlands 23.4% 25.5% 2.1%
United Kingdom 31.9% 34.4% 2.5%
Source: OECD Database.
These results show that the level in inequality is highest in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
In Ireland the Gini coefficient has decreased, whereas the Gini coefficient in the UK is
still increasing. A special concern in the UK is that a third of all children live in
households with incomes below half the national average (Treasury, 1999). The level of
inequality in Scandinavian and Rhine-land countries is less than in the UK, but
nevertheless growing. For the Netherlands and Finland the Gini coefficient between
1985 and 1995 rose by 2.1%.
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2.2 The replacement rates
The issue that taxation and income dependent benefits may lead to the appearance of a
poverty trap has been an object of studies for some years now. A possible way to
describe the burden of taxation and income dependent benefits on a central and local
level is to calculate the net replacement rates. Not only in the Netherlands, but also in
other European countries do high marginal deduction rates and net replacement rates
lead to poor incentives for people who live on social assistance to accept a low paid job.
Table 4 gives an overview of the net replacement rates for long-term unemployed at the
level of earnings of the average production worker (APW) and at the level of earnings
of 2/3 of the APW-level. The net replacement rate shows what the loss of income is
when losing a job and getting social assistance.
Table 4: Net replacement rates at APW and 2/3 of APW
2/3 APW earnings APW earnings
Belgium 90% 63%
Finland 97% 97%
Germany 61% 52%
Ireland 73% 62%
Netherlands 94% 79%
United Kingdom 89% 74%
Source: OECD (2000a). Figures used from the 1997 OECD Database on taxation and benefit
entitlements. It is assumed that the worker is 40 years old, has a dependent spouse and 2
children, and started to work at 18. Housing costs are assumed to be 20% of gross APW
earnings.
As table 4 shows, the net replacement rate lies between 60% and almost 100% at low
wage levels. Especially the net replacement rates for Finland and the Netherlands are
high. In Finland the net replacement rate is very high due to many cumulating social
security schemes and income taxation. Also for the Netherlands the net replacement rate
is relatively high. Only in Germany the net replacement rate is lower. A possible
explanation is that there is little support for housing costs. Table 4 does not show the
impact of local income dependent benefits. In the Netherlands, municipalities were
given means to support low income families to fight poverty. This development has a
large impact on the poverty trap. The marginal deduction rates in the Netherlands can
go up to or over 100% for low incomes. This means that there is no or hardly any
income gain when accepting a low paid job or improvement of the income-position.
Therefore, some economists point out that the local government role in providing social
assistance should be limited (Oers (2000)). Table 4 gives an average of net replacement
rates in different countries for one type of household. The effects differ per type of
household. In a recent report by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2000a)
different household types are considered. Results show that for all groups the marginal
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deduction rates reach levels of over 100%, but are the highest for low-income
households with children.
3. The policy measures in different countries
3.1 The Netherlands
The Dutch government has already taken some measures to reduce the poverty trap
(Ministry of Social Affairs (2000b), Ministry of Finance (1999)). In the last years the
Earned Income Tax Allowance has been raised. In 2000 this allowance is a tax
deduction of 12% of the taxable income with a maximum of € 1,465.1 However, one of
the disadvantages of such an allowance is that high wage earners get more support than
low wage earners. Therefore, due to the new 2001 Income Tax Act the Earned Income
Tax Allowance is going to be converted into an Employment Tax Credit. Furthermore,
the Employment Tax Credit is higher than the Earned Income Tax Allowance. Figure 1
gives an overview of the amount of Employment Tax Credit by certain levels of
earnings.2
                                                                
1 The exchange rates used in this  article are the fixed rates for Belgium, Germany, Finland,
Ireland and the Netherlands and the exchange rate of 8 December 2000 of € 1.64 for 1
English pound.
Figure 1  The Employment Tax
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The maximum amount of the Employment Tax Credit is € 920, which will be reached at
the minimum wage level (€ 15,117 gross income per year). The Employment Tax Credit
is paid to workers and self-employed people up to the amount of tax paid.
Furthermore, in 2001 premiums were introduced to reduce the poverty trap for benefit
claimants, who accept a full-time job and did have income support for at least one year.
This premium can be granted only once during a lifetime. The total amount of premium
is € 1,815. A quarter of the premium is paid every six months to somebody who holds a
job for a period of two years. Municipalities are responsible for paying these premiums.
It should be noticed that the granting of premiums anticipates on a future income
increase. This may occur not in all cases if one considers the low earning capacity of
some benefit claimants. Nevertheless, granting premiums can be a useful additional
instrument to stimulate a benefit claimant to accept a job and reduce the poverty trap for
some groups.
Furthermore, under the Income tax the basic personal allowance (that part of income,
which is not taxable) is converted into a General Tax Credit.3 Because the tax credit is
independent of the incremental tax rate, non-working partners will find it more
attractive to seek a paid job. With the tax reform 2001 the income tax rates on workers’
income are decreased. The basic tax rate is decreased by 1.55% to 32.35% and the top
rate is decreased by 8% to 52%.
In the new Income tax act some new instruments are introduced for (working) families
with children. First, a Combination Tax Credit is introduced aimed at making childcare
more affordable to working parents. The Combination Tax Credit is given to parents
with annual earnings exceeding € 3,938. The amount paid is € 103 per year for each
working parent. Second, a Child Tax Credit is introduced for families with an annual
income of less than € 54,501. The Child Tax Credit is € 38 and if income is less than
€ 27,251 it will be doubled.
Moreover, the Dutch government has announced that for childcare the current system of
income dependent benefits will be replaced by a tax credit.4 The introduction of a
Childcare Tax Credit will be combined with a change in the financing system.
Currently, parents pay a contribution depending on their household income. The rest is
financed by the government or by employers. A substantial part of the childcare places
                                                                                                                                                              
2 The amount of Employment Tax credit is calculated as follows: 1.748% of the earnings
with a maximum of € 129 and 10.732% of the earnings exceeding € 7,371.
3 The Personal Allowance is deductible from the taxable income and in general a fixed
amount of maximally € 4,061. This amount can be transferred between partners. The
General Tax credit is deductible from the tax that has to be paid and in general a fixed
amount of maximally € 1,507 for each taxpayer.
4 Source: Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, Kamerstukken 26587 nr. 9. (House of
Commons, 1999-2000, House of Commons 26587 no. 9 )
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are financed by the government on a restricted budget. This causes shortages of day-
care centres and long waiting lists for parents. In 2003, when the childcare facilities are
supposed to meet the actual demand, the childcare system will become fully demand
driven. Parents will receive an income dependent tax credit. Employers are supposed to
pay their share of the actual costs and the government pays the rest. The present role of
municipalities for regulating day-care centres will become less dominant.
3.2 United Kingdom
The UK government has taken several measures to reduce the poverty trap. The most
important UK-reform to make work pay is the replacement in October 1999 of the
Family Credit (FC) by the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) and the introduction
of the Childcare Tax Credit. There seem to be three important differences between
WFTC and FC:
· The WFTC is more generous than FC. According to Blundell and Brewer (2000) the
average award of the credit per year has risen from € 5,405 to € 6,520 (an increase
of 20%).
· The marginal pressure or the taper rate has been decreased from 70% for the FC to
55% for the WFTC.
· FC is an in-work means-tested benefit for working parents with low income, while
the WFTC is an in-work means-tested tax credit for the same target-group.
As a consequence of the increase in generosity of the WFTC the number of working
families receiving a credit has increased from around 800,000 to around 1 million and
the number of children receiving WFTC has increased with more than 30%. The
introduction of the WFTC seems an important explanation for the recent drop in poverty
figures given by the Treasury. According to Treasury (1999, p.24) about 580,000 adults
will be lifted out of poverty.
 
The WFTC is a refundable tax credit available to families working more than 16 hours a
week. The amount of the credit depends upon earnings, hours worked and the number
of children. The WFTC is paid through the wage packet. The WFTC for a couple with
one child and an average hourly wage of € 5.33 is given in figure 2. This average hourly
wage leads to an extra credit for working more than 30 hours with an annual income at a
level of € 8,500.
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Figure 2: The working Families Tax Credit
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Furthermore, the income tax rates on low income will be decreased. Per 1 January 2001
the basic tax rate will be decreased from 20% to 10%. The general personal allowance
will be raised by € 313 to € 7,235 in 2001.
Also the childcare system has changed dramatically. Under the old system up to € 1,902
per year of the registered childcare costs can be offset against net income. Under the
new system a childcare credit is given of up to 70% of eligible childcare costs, up to
maximum costs of  € 3,152 per year for one child and € 4,627 per year for two or more
children. Due to this measure there has been a 156% increase of families receiving
childcare credit.
3.3 Germany
In 2000 the German Parliament has adopted the Tax Reform 2000 (Ministry of Finance
(2000)). The tax reform consists of three phases. The first phase takes place 1 January
2001, the second 1 January 2003 and the third phase 1 January 2005. For the income tax
the tax reform measures are increasing the basic personal allowance and decreasing the
tax rates.
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The first phase of the tax reform increases the basic personal allowance to  € 7,158. At
the same time the basic tax rate will fall to 19.9% (from 25.9% in 1998) and the top rate
to 48.5%. As from 1 January 2003 the basic personal allowance will be further
increased up to € 7,414. At the same time the basic tax rate will be decreased to 17%
and the top rate to 47%. Per 1 January 2005 the basic personal allowance will be
increased up to € 7,669. At the same time the basic tax rate will fall to 15% while the
top rate will be cut to 42%.
The objective of this tax reform is to decrease the overall tax burden, especially for low
paid workers. Results show that sole earners with a low income profit most from this
tax reform. Over a period of 5 years they experience a decrease in their average tax
burden of almost 50%. By cutting the basic tax rate the German government’s goal is to
stimulate growth and create new jobs. The tax reform also has an important impact on
the social policy. The cut in the basic tax rate will mainly benefit small and medium
incomes, but also small unincorporated companies. The objective of cutting the top rate
is to achieve an internationally appropriate top rate level.
So, in Germany there are no plans to introduce in-work benefits or credits.
Nevertheless, in Germany a debate about such an instrument takes place. For example
the Future Commission of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung has proposed to exempt a certain
monthly income from National Insurance and to phase out this exemption.
The tax reform does not have any specific measures to enhance childcare facilities.
However, the German tax system does have a monthly child grant in the form of a tax
credit. The credit is € 138 for the first and second child € 153 for the third child and
€ 179 for the fourth and any further child. The tax credit is granted as a refund if not
enough tax is paid.
3.4 Belgium
In 2000 the Belgian government has proposed a tax reform for the years 2001 to 2003
(cf. Reijnders (2000), Plasman (2000)). The outline of this tax reform has been
approved by the Belgian parliament; the actual law is still waiting to be passed by the
Belgian parliament. The tax reform is imposed in two separate phases; the actual
implementation dates have yet to be set.
The first phase of the tax reform is focused at the reduction of the tax burden on labour-
income and consists of two measures:
· The introduction of an in-work tax credit of € 496 per year;
· The reduction of the tax burden for average incomes by means of adjusting the tax
brackets and reducing the number of tax rates by abolishing the two highest rates.
The in-work tax credit is meant for working individuals with an income around the
minimum wage. Every individual with an income out of work is eligible for this tax
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credit. This tax credit consists of a fixed amount of € 496 for individuals with a taxable
income between € 3,718 and € 12,395. The tax credit is phased in between € 2,479 and
€ 3,718 and phased out between € 12,395 and € 16,113. The tax credit is granted as a
refund if not enough tax is paid. Figure 3 gives an overview of the in-work tax credit.
Figure 3: In Work Tax Credit
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The Belgian government decided to adjust the second and third tax brackets in order to
decrease the tax burden on or around the average income. In the second phase of the tax
reform the personal allowance for married couples will be raised to double the level of a
single person. In order to reduce the marginal deduction rates and to keep the Belgian
economic position competitive in relation to the surrounding countries, the Belgian
government has proposed to abolish the highest tax rates. The top rate will be lowered
from 55% to 50% after tax reform.
The second phase of the tax reform is focused on treating single persons, married and
not married couples equally. The second phase of the tax reform individualises the tax
system in Belgium. It abolishes the most visible differences between single and married
persons.
This tax reform does not have any specific measures to enhance childcare in Belgium.
In an earlier stage several measures have been taken to extend the number of childcare
facilities. Firstly, the number of available places has been extended by new possibilities
with subsidised jobs and by allocating more budget to childcare. Secondly, childcare
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facilities have been extended by forming organisations, for example an organisation in
the Brussels region has been started which offers childcare facilities to unemployed
people when participating in training and searching for employment.
3.5 Finland
In Finland the recession of the early 1990s led to a dramatic rise of the unemployment
rate. In order to stimulate employment, changes have been made in Finland’s tax system
since the mid 1990s (cf. Ilmakunnas (2000)). The most important policy measure is the
introduction of the so-called earned income allowance in municipal taxation in order to
encourage low-paid and temporary work. The structure of this in-work allowance is
given in figure 4.
The role of the earned income allowance has been intensified in recent years (Figure 4).
The current maximum amount of the allowance is nearly the average monthly wage for
women, and since 1997 the earned income allowance has been deducted only from
wage and entrepreneurial income. It is going to be raised to € 2,079 in 2002. The effect
of the allowance is obviously lower than the effect of a credit, because the relief is the
deduction from the tax allowance times the marginal tax rate. In Finland the income tax
rate for municipalities is on average 18%. The earned income allowance is in municipal
taxation since state income tax is only paid when the yearly income exceeds € 8,006.
Figure 4: Earned Income Allowance 1996-2000
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The entitlement to this allowance is based on the income of the individual. The
allowance is not granted if one pays no local taxes. Furthermore, the basic rate in the
state tax system has decreased from 6% to 5% between 1997 and 2001.
The Finnish system of childcare has much in common with the current Dutch system.
Childcare is subsidised through public provision and there is a tax relief to reduce the
work-related costs. In Finland the right to publicly provided child day-care has been
extended to cover all children under school age. The fees for public day care cover, on
average, 10-14 % of the total costs of these services. The fees are means-tested against
the family income. Accordingly, in Finland the government is strongly subsidising the
use of childcare services. Childcare services are mainly publicly provided and they are
relatively cheap to the families needing these services. There is also a means-tested
allowance for private childcare which is paid to the provider of the service (not to the
family directly). Due to a long tradition of public child care there seems to be no need
for large-scale changes in this respect.
Furthermore, the family support system includes also the child home care allowance
(amount depends on the number of children and the amount of the means-tested
supplement). Families in which one partner cares for children under the age of 3 at
home are entitled to it. This scheme was launched in the late 1980s.
3.6 Ireland
In many ways Ireland’s policy to increase incentives to work is similar to the UK (cf.
Daly (2000)). In recent years efforts have been made to make Ireland’s in-work benefit -
the Family Income Supplement (FIS)- more generous. The multiplier has been
increased from 50% to 60%, the maximum earning ceiling has been increased and the
basis for assessment of the supplement has been changed from gross earnings to
earnings after taxes and social contributions. As a consequence the number of working
families receiving a benefit has increased.
The Irish’s FIS is a weekly payment for families at work on low pay. Families qualify
for the FIS if they are in full-time employment which is expected to last for at least 3
months and if they have at least one qualified child who is normally living with and
being supported by the claimant. Full-time employment is defined as employment for at
least 19 hours per week (or 38 hours every fortnight). The third means-test is an
income-test. A family qualifies for the FIS if the family income after taxes and social
contributions is less than the amount given in table 5.
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Table 5: Income Limits of the FIS (2000-2001)
Number of children Income Limit (in €  per year)
1 15,387
2 16,708
3 18,029
4 19,350
5 21,000
6 22,322
7 23,444
8 or more 24,567
The amount of FIS is calculated as 60% of the difference between the weekly income
and the weekly income limit. The FIS is paid by a book of payable orders, which can be
cashed weekly at a Post Office, and it is refundable. In figure 5 the FIS for a family with
one child is given.
Furthermore, there are plans to replace this in-work benefit by an in-work tax credit,
which is fully refundable for the same target-group. One of the reasons for this policy
change is that the non-take is estimated to be significant. The government has stated to
complete this policy by April  2001.
Moreover, there is a Back to Work Allowance (BWA) programme, which reduces the
poverty trap for benefit claimants (see Ifo (2000)). To qualify for the BWA an
Figure 6: Family Income Supplement
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individual has to be getting Lone Parent’s Allowance or should have been unemployed
for the last 12 months and got a job for at least 20 hours per week. Participants in the
scheme will receive support for 3 years. They will receive 75% of their weekly social
welfare payment in the first year, 50% in the second year and 25% in the third year. The
allowance is deposited weekly on the participant’s bank account.
Also marginal tax rates for those with low earnings have been reduced. The basic rate
has been decreased by 2% for 2000/2001 to 22%. Contrary to the UK there are no plans
to introduce a tax credit for childcare. In Ireland the measures taken to enhance
childcare consist of various different benefits granted to providers of childcare. The tax-
system provides relief for those providing childcare by means of a capital allowance for
the costs of constructing, refurbishing or extending the premises used for childcare.
Furthermore, the childcare provided by the employer is exempted from the Income Tax.
4. Overview
In this section a comparison of the measures taken by the different countries to make
work pay will be given. Table 6 shows the differences in the in-work credit of the six
countries that are described in this paper.  Only Germany does not have an in-work
credit or benefit.
Table 6: In-work credits in 2001
Target
group
Refundable Maximum Phase in Phase out Hour
criterion
Belgium (2001) Individuals Yes € 496 Yes Yes No
Finland (1996) Individuals No € 263a Yes Yes No
Netherlands (2001) Individuals No € 920 Yes No No
Ireland Families Yes € 6,000b No Yes Yes
UK (1999) Families Yes € 11,924b No Yes Yes
a  Taxes saved reach a maximum of €263 when using a (overage) marginal rate of 18%.
b The maximum of the FIS and WFTC depends on the number of children and the weekly
income. The figure shown is the maximum amount received by family with one child and an
hourly wage of  € 5.33. The maximum of the FIS is reached at low income levels and phases
out quickly.
The target group of first three countries are individuals. For Ireland and UK the in-work
credit is targeted towards families with children. Due to the smaller target group the
credit can be higher and, therefore, this credit has important distributional aspects as
well. It should be noticed the shown maximum of the OFTC and the FIS is reached at
low income levels and phases out quickly. Moreover, the credit in Ireland and the UK
have an hour criterion, so that parents have to work a certain amount of time to qualify
for the credit. The distribution of working hours shows a spike at this threshold,
indicating that the incentive to increase work efforts after this threshold is poorer
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(Brewer and Blundell (2000)). In most countries the in-work credit is phased out. For
persons who will be confronted with these phase out there can be negative incentive
effects. Moreover, two countries (the Netherlands and Ireland) have a back to work
allowance or premium for benefit claimants.
Table 7 shows the changes in basic and top rates and the basic tax allowance or credit in
the different countries after the various tax reforms.
Table 7: Changes in basic and top rates and the amount of basic personal
allowance or basic tax credit after tax reforms
Basic
rate
Top rate Type of zero
tax rate
Amount Maximum first
tax bracket
Belgium (per 2002)   0% - 5% Allowance € 5,280 €  6,495
Finland (1997-2000) - 1%  - 0.5% Allowance € 7,568 €10,697
Germany (2000-2005) - 10.9% - 8% Allowance € 7,206 €  9,249
Ireland  (2000-2001) - 2% - 2% Allowance € 5,969 €21,590a
Netherlands (2001) -1.55% - 8% Tax Credit € 1,507 €14,870
UK (2001) -10%   0% Allowance € 7,235 €  9,743
a The tax brackets are different for single persons and married couples with or without
dependent children. The figure shown in this table is the maximum amount for a single
person without dependent children.
As shown in table 7 Germany makes work pay by lowering the basic rate. Therefore,
the budgetary relief of the German tax reform is rather large (1.8% of GDP). In the
Netherlands and Belgium the budgetary relief of the described tax reforms is less than
1% of GDP. As a consequence, for other countries the decrease in the basic rate is much
lower than in Germany. Only the UK decreases the basic rate with 10%. With the
exception of the UK, more emphasis is put on lowering the top rate in the countries
surveyed in this paper. Furthermore, table 7 shows the amount for the basic allowance
or basic tax credit and the maximum for the first tax bracket after the reform.
Especially, in German tax reform the basic allowance will be raised substantially.
In order to stimulate participation of women with children there has been an
accompanying tax policy in childcare. The most provoking is the one in the UK with the
introduction of a childcare tax credit. The Netherlands introduced a small childcare tax
credit, which is available for all forms of childcare as well. Furthermore, it announced
the introduction of a childcare tax credit in 2003. Other countries have a tax allowance
or subsidise the provider.
The effectiveness of different policy options
There are different ways to make work pay. An interesting question is which policy is
the most effective in employment terms. In the Netherlands different proposals with the
same budgetary amount have been compared with the help of a general equilibrium
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model, the so-called MIMIC-model (see Graafland et al. (2001)). Although these
simulations are stylised, they can be useful for understanding the effectiveness of
different policy options. If the main objective of the tax reform is to reduce the
unemployment among the low skilled, an in-work tax credit is more effective than
reducing the basic rate. A tax credit is at least two times as effective as reducing the
basic rate. Phasing out the in-work tax credit makes it even more effective in reducing
the unemployment among the low skilled, although there can be some drawbacks in
incentives for training and labour supply in hours for the low-skilled workers. In terms
of labour supply (in hours) reducing the basic rate is a better instrument than an in-work
credit.
A higher basic tax credit (or basic allowance) reduces labour supply through income
effects. Moreover, it raises the replacement rate. Therefore, the impact on employment
is relatively small compared to the other two tax simulations. Of course, the income of
benefit recipients is better off in this simulation.
Also for the UK simulations with the tax reform are available. According to the study of
Blundell and Brewer (2000) the impact of the WFTC on employment for families with
children in the UK varies between –0.83% for women in couples with a working partner
and 1.85% for single parents. Apparently, for the first group the income effect
dominates. If the employment tax credit is individualised, such negative effects on
employment for women in couples will not occur as is shown by Dutch simulations. It
should be noticed that the WFTC is also aimed at people on income support.
5. Conclusions
With the exception of Germany, in the countries surveyed in this paper there seems to
be a consistent policy of making work pay through the introduction of a substantial in-
work tax credit and a small decrease of the basic rate. Although already important
efforts have been made to make work pay, it is commonly agreed that further efforts are
needed. In most countries the cumulative marginal deduction rates of tax and benefit
schemes still reach levels close to 100 per cent at the minimum wage level. If, as is the
case in the Netherlands, local policy is designed to alleviate poverty for a small group,
the poverty trap will become more severe. This means that there is hardly any income
gain when leaving the benefit situation.
It should be noticed that in the surveyed countries the in-work credit has been worked
out in different directions. In the UK and Ireland the in-work credit is targeted towards
families and phases out quickly. In other countries it is targeted towards individuals and
it phases out more slowly (or not in the Netherlands). In policy discussions the shape of
the in-work credit has been debated heavily and the outcome depends on the labour
market situation, the distributional aspects and the wage distribution. These
circumstances can be quite different in the surveyed countries.
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Given limited resources for future tax reforms increasing in-work credits seems
appropriate for further progress in making work pay. However, several interesting
issues are accompanying such a policy choice. Firstly, which group should the in-work
credit be targeted at? As presented by Brewer and Blundell (2000), choosing a family
with children seems to have disincentive effects for the second partner. Therefore, in the
March 2000 Budget the UK announced a programme of future reforms including an
employment tax credit as well. Secondly, for some groups, especially single persons
with children, there seems a need for an integrated system that incorporates the different
types of support, such as childcare. Thirdly, the relation between the in-work credit and
other income dependent benefits should be studied carefully. For example, in the UK
raising the WFTC can be offset by lower housing benefits. Fourth, it is very important
to have more information about wage progression on the lower side of the labour
market and to discuss the relation between tapering away the tax credit and the
reduction of incentives and wage progression. Thereby, the relation between the taper
rate, the minimum wage and wage distribution is important.
24
References
Blundell, R. and M. Brewer (2000), Tax and Benefit Reform in the UK: Making Work
Pay, London
Daly, M. (2000), Comment Paper from Ireland on Tax and Benefit Reform in the UK:
Making Work Pay, Belfast
Duncan A.S. and C. Giles (1996), Labour Supply Incentives and Recent Family Credit
Reforms, Economic Journal,  106, 142-155
Graafland, J.J., R.A. de Mooij, A.G.H. Nibbelink and A. Nieuwenhuis (2001),
MIMICing Tax Policies and the Labour Market, to appear in Contributions to
Economic Analysis, Elsevier/North-Holland
Haveman, R. and B. Wolfe (2000), Welfare to Work in the US: A Model for other
Developed Nations, International Tax and Public Finance, 7, 95-114
HM Treasury (1999), Tackling Poverty and Extending Opportunity, London
Ifo Institute for Economic Research (2000), Employment-conditional Tax Credit and
Benefit Systems, CES-ifo Forum, 3, 35-41
Ilmakunnas, S. (2000), Comment Paper from Finland on Tax and Benefit Reform in the
UK: Making Work Pay, Helsinki
Lönnroth, J. (2000), Searching for Active- and Preventive Approaches, Working Paper
“Conferences on Job”, 27-28 January 2000, Helsinki
Ministry of Finance (1999), Memorie van Toelichting Belastingherziening 2001
[Explanatory Statement to Tax Reform 2001], The Hague
Ministry of Finance  (2000), Tax Reform 2000 - An Overview, Berlin
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2000a), De armoedeval, analyse and
oplossingen [The Poverty Trap, Analysis and Solutions] , The Hague
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2000b), Sociale Nota 2001 [Social Survey
2001] , The Hague
OECD (1998), Employment Outlook , Paris
OECD (2000a), Policies Towards Full Employment, Paris
OECD (2000b), Labour Market and Social Policy. Trends and Driving Factors in
Income Distribution and Poverty in the OECD Area, Occasional Paper no. 42,
Paris
Oers, J. van (2000), Armoedeval: Leuker noch makkelijker [The Poverty-trap: Easier
Neither Funny], ESB, 86, 895
Plasman, R. (2000), Comment Paper from Belgium on Tax and Benefit Reform in the
UK: Making Work Pay, Brussels
Reynders, D. (2000), Personenbelasting: Ontwerp van Fiscale Hervorming [Income
Tax: Design of Tax Reform] , Brussels
Tweede Kamer (2000), Kamerstukken vergaderjaar 1999-2000 26587 nr. 9. [House of
Commons 1999-2000, 26587 no. 9]
